Pakistan has been linked with Iran acquiring nuclear weapons components, according to a new report from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Iran's nuclear programme received significant assistance in the past from a proliferation network headed by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, says the unclassified version of the report, posted Tuesday on the agency's website www.cia.gov.

The Khan network of black-marketing nuke technology was known to have supplied Libya and North Korea with crude designs of old Pakistani centrifuges used to enrich uranium but the report suggests the bomb-making designs the network provided to Iran in the 1990s were more significant than the US government previously disclosed.

The report says the agency remained convinced Iran is pursuing a clandestine weapons programme, despite claims to the contrary by the Tehran government.

The posting of the report comes two days before a meeting in Vienna of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN nuclear monitoring group, is scheduled to review the status of Iran's weapons programme.

The report says Iran, despite its assurances to the international community, continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programmes to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Iran is also working to improve delivery systems.

To this end, Iran continued to seek foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how. During the reporting period, Iran still focused particularly on entities in Russia, China, North Korea and Europe.

The report said the United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in contradiction to its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

During 2003, Iran continued to pursue an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle ostensibly for civilian purposes but with clear weapons potential. 

International scrutiny and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran from using facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its weapons programme as long as Tehran remains a party to the NPT.

However, Iran could use the same technology at other covert locations for military applications.

Iran continues to use its civilian nuclear energy programme to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire the entire nuclear fuel cycle.

Iran claims that this fuel cycle would be used to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors such as the 1,000-mW light water reactor that Russia is continuing to build at the southern port city of Bushehr.

However, Iran does not need to produce its own fuel for this reactor because Russia has pledged to provide the fuel throughout the operating lifetime of the reactor and is negotiating with Iran to take back the irradiated spent fuel.

An Iranian opposition group, beginning in August 2002, revealed several previously undisclosed Iranian nuclear facilities, sparking numerous IAEA inspections since February 2003.

Subsequent reports by the IAEA director general revealed numerous failures by Iran to disclose facilities and activities, which run contrary to its IAEA safeguards obligations.

Before the reporting period, the Khan network provided Iran with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models, and components, the CIA report said.

--Indo-Asian News Service