"The US can use its economic assistance to strengthen the rule of law and adherence to the constitution," says Husain Haqqani, a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in a paper released by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
 
"It can assist in bolstering the capacity of inter-provincial institutions such as the Council of Common Interests and the National Finance Commission. Pakistan needs to get back on the path of normal political and economic development, for which it must address its internal crises," Haqqani says in the 24-page paper.

The paper, entitled "Pakistan's Internal Divisions", is part of the CSIS project called Pakistan's Future and US Policy Options. Haqqani served in high positions in previous Pakistani governments and also as ambassador to Sri Lanka.

"The US too cannot afford the current drift in a large Muslim country abutting the Persian Gulf, South Asia and Central Asia. The fact that Pakistan is armed with nuclear weapons, has a large standing army and a huge intelligence service with covert operations capability add to the urgency of dealing with the doubts about its future course," he emphasises.

President Pervez Musharraf's promises when he assumed power in 1999 - that he would preside over a military regime with a difference, create a sustainable federal democracy and bring about the devolution of power to local governments - have remained largely unrealised, the author noted.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Musharraf also promised to end the influence of Islamic militants within Pakistan.

While several packages of reforms have been announced and in some cases partially implemented, these have largely ignored the provincial level of government, focusing instead on local government.

"Most significantly, the scheme of reform is based on the will (or whim) of the country's chief executive rather than on an interconnected structure of self-sustaining institutions, subject to well defined and fully implemented laws," Haqqani asserts.

Despite some devolution of power, "both the provincial and district governments largely (work) at the mercy of Islamabad", he adds.

In a somewhat scathing critique, Haqqani maintains that Musharraf is trying to change Pakistan's politics through a combination of constitutional and political manoeuvres.

In 2002, "the military micro-managed the pre-election environment to ensure the success of a pro-Musharraf faction of the PML (Pakistan Muslim League), called PML-Q and nicknamed the King's Party".

The success of Islamic fundamentalist parties, especially in the border provinces of Pakistan, Haqqani contends, "was largely the result of Musharraf's avowed policy of keeping the mainstream parties out of a future government.

"The violent vigilantism of some Islamists has become a serious threat to Pakistani civil society, in addition to promoting sectarianism. Operating outside the framework of the rule of law, the Islamists have the potential to disrupt the conduct of foreign policy, especially in view of their support for anti-India militants in Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan," he argues.

"There are persistent reports that security services are infiltrated by terrorist sympathisers as well as by organised crime networks, a legacy of Pakistan's state sponsorship of the Taliban and anti-India jehadi groups," he says.

"Pakistan needs to get back on the path of normal political and economic development and, to do this, it must address its internal crises. The US too cannot afford the current drift in a large Muslim country abutting the Persian Gulf, South Asia and Central Asia," asserts Haqqani.

Pakistan's military considers it important to maintain the alliance with the US. "This gives the US a psychological advantage in influencing the course of Pakistan's domestic policies," argues Haqqani.

"The Pakistani military's support for Islamic militants, its use of the intelligence apparatus for controlling domestic politics, and its refusal to cede power to a constitutional democratic government should not be condoned by the US."

Washington has attached few conditions to its aid, he points out, and as a result the spending patterns of Pakistan's government have not changed significantly.

"The US should use its aid as a lever to influence Pakistan's policies. Pakistan's state sponsorship of Islamist militants, its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles at the expense of education and healthcare, and its refusal to democratise should not be ignored.

"US economic assistance should be a means of tackling these sources of Pakistani radicalisation, instead of being a shot in the arm for the country's ruling military-bureaucratic elite," Haqqani maintains.

--Indo-Asian News Service